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Brown v. Palmer: Public Forum Analysis and 
the Military1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Brown v. Palmer (Brown Il), 2 the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit sitting en bane held, by a six to four margin, 
that a military base3 was not open to protestors' political 
speech during an open house on the base. This decision must 
be questioned not only because of its result, but also because of 
the majority's automatic deferral to the military on the impor-
tant matter of free speech. This note contends that the 
majority's holding, that the military should be virtually free 
from First Amendment scrutiny during an open house, gives 
the military too much license to restrict free speech. 
Part II of this note outlines what the Supreme Court has 
defined as public fora, nonpublic fora, and designated public 
fora. These definitions are important because they help to pro-
vide the background for the Tenth Circuit's decision in Brown 
II. Part III introduces the facts of the Brown cases. Part IV 
sets forth the court's reasoning regarding the military-
base\public-forum issue during open houses. Part V analyzes 
the Brown decisions, stressing the following: 
1) The objective evidence shows that a public forum was 
created on the day of the open house; 
2) Restrictions were placed on the protestors' speech solely 
because of the content of that speech; and 
1. The author is a 1st Lt. in the United States Marine Corps. Some of the 
information in this note regarding general military operations is, therefore, based 
on personal knowledge. 
2. Both Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 14::15 (lOth Cir. 1990) (2-1 decision) and 
Brown v. Palmer, 944 F.2d 7:12 (lOth Cir. 1991) (en bane) ((j-4 decision) are used 
in this note and referred to in the text as Brown when dicussing both cases, and 
Brown I and Brown II when discussing a specific case. The latter is the en bane 
opinion. The arguments in the two hearings are almost identical, both finding for 
the military. 
3. The facts of this case deal specifically with events at Peterson Air Force 
Base, in Colorado. 
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3) Military bases should not automatically be accorded 
special status for purposes of public forum analysis. 
This note concludes that, based on the facts of Brown, the polit-
ical and ideological speech of the protestors should have been 
permitted because the military base was a public forum on the 
day of the open house. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The degree to which the govemment can regulate free 
speech on govemment property depends on the type of property 
involved and whether that property is classified as a public 
forum or a nonpublic forum.4 The military, as part of the gov-
ernment, is bound by the same limitations on restricting free 
speech as other govemment agencies.5 The basic doctrinal test 
for what constitutes a public forum is set forth in Perry Educa-
tion Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association.6 In 
Perry, the United States Supreme Court grouped government 
property into three categories for First Amendment speech 
purposes. The categories are: 
1) traditional public fora, 
2) public fora created by govemment designation, and 
3) nonpublic fora. 7 
Traditional public fora and nonpublic fora are at opposing 
ends of a spectrum. Traditional public fora are public places, 
such as streets and parks, which have been traditionally open 
to assembly and debate by citizens.8 "In these quintessential 
public forums, the govemment may not prohibit all communi-
cative activity."9 If the state excludes speech based on its con-
tent at traditional public fora, the courts review such exclu-
4. Brown, 91fi F.2d at 1440. 
fi. The military, however, traditionally has been allowed greater leeway in de-
ciding free speech issues than other government agencies. See infra notes 12, lfi, 
42, 91 and accompanying text. 
6. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
7. !d. at 4fi-46. 
8. See, e.g., Hague v. Commission. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 
515-16 (1939). 
9. Perry, 460 U.S. at 4fi. 
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sions with strict scrutiny. Under the rigorous strict scrutiny 
test, the government must show that the regulation banning 
such speech is both necessary to serve a compelling state in-
terest and narrowly tailored to achieve that end. 10 
If the state excludes speech in a content-neutral manner at 
traditional public fora, however, the state is granted more free-
dom in prohibiting speech. The state may put time, place and 
manner of expression restrictions on the speech. Regulating 
speech in a content-neutral manner means simply that the 
state excludes all forms of a particular expression without 
regard to the message. For example, if the state prohibited all 
parades on Tuesdays, this would be a content-neutral restric-
tion. If the state only prohibited Republicans from participating 
in parades, however, the regulation would not be content-neu-
tral. If the regulation is content-neutral, the government inter-
est need only be significant as opposed to compelling, but the 
government must still leave open alternative channels of com-
munication. 11 
At the oth·9r end of the spectrum are nonpublic fora. 
Nonpublic fora are public properties which carry with them no 
fundamental right to free speech because they are not tradi-
tionally used for communicative purposes. 12 The United States 
Supreme Court, speaking about some types of public property, 
emphatically stated that "the 'First Amendment does not guar-
antee access to property simply because it is owned or con-
trolled by the government."' 13 This is so because the govern-
ment has the power to safeguard the property under its control 
for its originally assigned use. 14 
10. !d. 
11. !d. 
12. See. e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788 (1985) (participating in Combined Federal Campaign found to be nonpublic 
forum); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (finding military bases as 
generally nonpublic fora); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n 460 
U.S. 37 (1983) (finding school district's internal mail system a nonpublic forum); 
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (finding a military base during normal train-
ing hours a nonpublic forum); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (finding a 
prison a nonpublic forum). 
18. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)). 
14. Adderley v. Florida, 885 U.S. at 47. 
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In the middle of the spectrum lie "designated" public fora. 
These are places that traditionally have not been open for pub-
lic assembly or debate, but for which the government intention-
ally has opened (either subjectively or objectively) for expres-
sive activity. 15 In these fora, as in traditional public fora in 
which speech is banned in a content-neutral manner, the gov-
ernment may impose reasonable restrictions on speech such as 
time, place and manner. 16 The government may not, however, 
arbitrarily restrict speech based solely on its content. 17 Under 
the strict scrutiny test, restrictions must be narrowly tailored 
to a significanti8 government interest and leave open ade-
quate alternative channels for the communication. 19 
The label chosen for the particular forum, whether tradi-
tional, nonpublic, or designated, is very important because the 
forum labels determine which level of scrutiny the court will 
apply-strict, intermediate, or rational-basis. The court will 
most likely apply strict scrutiny to traditional public fora, inter-
mediate scrutiny to designated public fora, and rational-basis 
scrutiny to nonpublic fora. 
The level of scrutiny that is applied may, in turn, deter-
mine the outcome of the case. 20 If strict scrutiny is applied, 
the government is very likely to fail in its attempts to regulate 
speech. If rational-basis scrutiny is applied, the government 
prohibition on speech will most likely be upheld. If intermedi-
ate scrutiny is applied, however, it is difficult to predict how 
the court will hold. 
15. Brown, 91fi F.2d at 1440 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 4fi4 U.S. 26~{ (19R1) 
(finding state university meeting facilities expressly made available for use by 
students a designated forum); Cit~r of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (finding school board meetings 
opened to the public by choice or state statute a designated forum); Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. fi46 (197fi) (finding municipal auditorium and 
city-leased theatEr designed for and dedicated to expressive activities a designated 
forum)). 
16. Brown, 91fi F.2d at 1440. 
17. ld. 
18. A "significant" government interest is nothing more than an interest more 
important than a rational interest, but not as important as a compelling interest. 
The United States Supreme Court has never come up with a workable definition of 
what a "significant" government interest is. For example, no one knows exactly 
when, in abortion cases, the government has a significant interest and when they 
have a compelling interest in the fetus. 
19. Brown, 915 F.2d at 1440. 
20. ld. at 1440-41. 
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Ill. FACTS OF THE BROWN CASES 
Military bases across the nation routinely sponsor public 
open houses once a year on Armed Forces Day.21 These open 
houses allow citizens to enter the base and observe the military 
weapons systems and training techniques. The open houses are 
attempts by the military to garner support and foster commu-
nity relations with the cities in which the bases are located.22 
The facts of the Brown cases involve events a military open 
house. Six peace activists passed out leaflets, during an Air 
Force open house, which portrayed the horrors of war and 
generally advocated an anti-war message.23 The activists were 
issued bar letters24 and forced off the base after they refused 
to cease distributing the leaflets.25 The bar letters prohibited 
the activists from entering the base for any reason, including to 
attend an open house, without prior written permission from 
the base commander.26 
One year later, the protestors filed suit seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent the base commander from executing 
the order, claiming that their right of speech had been violated 
21. The open houses are authorized by the respective military regulations of 
each branch of the Armed Forces. Brown v. Palmer, 6R9 F. Supp. 1045, 104R-49 
(D. Colo. 19RR). 
22. Brown, 91fi F.2d at 1446 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
23. Bruwn, 91fi F.2d at 143R. 
24. Bar letters are letters issued to civilians that prevent them from entering a 
military base. They are issued by the Commanding General of the base, according 
to appropriate military regulations, after an administrative hearing has been held 
to determine the cause for the removal. Reasons why civilians, even dependents of 
Armed Forces personnel, may be barred include, but are not limited to: disruption 
of military operations, disturbing the peace or creating a nuisance, disobeying mili-
tary base orders, or committing a crime on the base. 
25. Brown, 915 F.2d at 14~{R. The base commander issued the bar letters pur-
suant to 1R U.S.C. § 13R2 (19RR) which provides: 
Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States goes upon any 
military, naval, or Coast Guard reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, sta-
tion, or installation, for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regula-
tion; or 
Whoever reenters or is found within any such reservation, post, fort, 
arsenal, yard, station, or installation, after having been removed there-
from or ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or 
charge thereof--
Shall be fined not more than $fi00 or imprisoned not more than six 
months, or both. 
26. Brown, 91fi F.2d at 14:~R. 
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solely because of the content of their message.~7 The suit peti-
tioned relief from the bar order and sought to permit the peace 
activists to attend a future open house to be held at the 
base.28 
The district court concluded that the base became a public 
forum on the day of the open house. 29 The district court then 
applied a strict scrutiny test and found for the plaintiffs.30 
The government appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed de 
novo the district court's finding31 and overruled (two to one 
and then six to four en bane) the district court. The court of ap-
peals held that the base was not a public forum, either by tra-
dition or designation.32 Instead, it concluded that the base 
was a nonpublic forum on all days, even the day of the open 
house.33 
IV. REASONING OF THE BROWN DECISIONS 
The crucial issue in the Tenth Circuit's analysis is whether 
the Air Force base was a public forum during the open house. 
If the court found the base to be a public forum and the restric-
tions on the speech content-based, the government would then 
have to meet the strict scrutiny test and demonstrate a com-
pelling state interest to justify its restrictions on free speech.34 
This strict scrutiny test is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
pass. 
If, however, the base were deemed a nonpublic forum, the 
military would need only to prove that the restrictions were 
reasonable and not the product of discrimination based on the 
protestors' message. This rational-basis tese5 is much easier 
to satisfy than the strict scrutiny test. 36 
27. I d. at 1488-89. 
2R. I d. at 148R. 
29. !d. at 14:-JR-89. 
80. [d. at 1489. 
31. I d. at 1441. 
:-l2. I d. at 1440-4:-l. 
:n I d. at 144:-!. 
a4. I d. at 1440-41. 
:ifi. The rational basis test requires nothing more than a rational (even tenu-
ous) relationship hetween the government's purported goal and the restriction on 
the speech. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 239fi, 2406 (1991) (citation omitted). 
:16. Brown, 91fi F.2d at 1440-41. 
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If the base were viewed as a designated forum, the mili-
tary would have to show that there was some important gov-
ernmental interest at stake that justified curbing the 
protestors' speech. Using this intermediate scrutiny test, the 
court could plausibly find for either the military or the protes-
tors. 
The majority of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the base was a nonpublic forum. 37 To support its 
holding, the Brown I court cited Greer v. Spock. 38 In Greer, 
the United State Supreme Court upheld a ban on political 
speeches at the Fort Dix military installation. The Greer Court 
held that there is "no generalized constitutional right to make 
political speeches or distribute leaflets" on military bases, even 
if they are generally open to the public. 39 The Court further 
stressed that '"it is ... the business of a military installa-
tion ... to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum."'40 
In its analysis, the Brown I court recognized that opening 
a military base to some speech and activity does not mean that 
the base must be opened to all speech or activity. The Brown I 
court cited several United States Supreme Court cases to sup-
port this assertion.41 
The Tenth Circuit relied on Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Education Fund, Inc. 4 '2 to make its most important ar-
gument, and the basis of its holding-that the Air Force base 
was not a public forum because a public forum is not created 
by inaction, but must be created by an intentional abandoning 
of the nonpublic forum status.43 In Cornelius, the Supreme 
Court stated that "[t]he government does not create a public 
:n !d. at 144:1. 
:1H. ld. at 1441 (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. R2R (1976)). 
:19. (T!wr, 424 U.S. at KiR. 
40. Brown, !Hfi F.2d at 1441 (quoting Greer, 424 U.S. at R:38). 
41. !d. at 1440-4fi. Cited cases include the following: United States v. Kokinda, 
497 U.S. 720 (1990) (holding post office could permit pamphleteering and other 
forms of protest un its sidewalk premises yet prohibit all forms of solicitation); 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (198fi) (find-
ing the Combined Federal Campaign did not have to include political advocacy 
groups in its list of charitable organizations); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local 
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (19R3) (holding public school district's internal mail 
system was not a designated public forum, even though it was available to the 
sehoul union and other non-profit organizations); Lehman v. City uf Shaker 
Heights, 41H U.S. 298 (1974) (finding mass transit authority permitted to advertise 
everything yet exclude political advertising). 
42. 473 U.S. 7R8 (198fi). 
43. Brown, 91fi F.2d at 1443-44. 
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forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only 
by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public dis-
course."44 Both Brown court majorities interpreted "intention-
ally" from this recent Supreme Court definition to mean that 
one should look principally at the testimony of Air Force offi-
cials rather than at the events that actually took place the day 
of the open house.45 
The Brown I majority based its conclusion that the base 
was a nonpublic forum on the following grounds: first, there 
was a complete "lack of any evidence suggesting that the gov-
ernment abandoned any claim of special interest in regulating 
the open house celebrations at ... [the base]";46 and second, 
"the military did not intend to open ... [the base] to [appel-
lants] and other individuals or groups seeking to convey ideo-
logical or political messages."47 
Assuming that the military base is a nonpublic forum, 
however, does not end the inquiry.48 Barring the protestors 
from the base on the day of the open house must be both rea-
sonable and viewpoint neutral. 49 As the Brown II court stated, 
"[a]lthough the government is permitted greater latitude to reg-
ulate speech in a nonpublic forum, it must still regulate in a 
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral manner.""0 The court concluded 
that the ban met both of these requirements. 5 1 
V. ANALYSIS 
In essence, the Brown courts held that the government 
may selectively preclude discussion of certain general topics, 
while at the same time inviting the public onto its premises to 
participate in speech on a variety of other topics. 52 Therefore, 
banning the protestors while allowing others to exercise free 
speech posed no problem for the Brown majorities.53 
44. Cornelius, 418 U.S. at R02 (citation omitted). 
4fi. Brown, 91fi F.2d at 1443. 
46. ld. 
47. lrl. 
4R. ld. at 1444. 
49. Id. 
fiO. ld. 
fi 1. !d. at 144fi. 
fi2. Irl. at 1441. 
fi::l. The Brown I majority sought to bolster its conclusions hy citing the Eighth 
Circuit's Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. U.S. Air Force, 67fi F.2d 1010 (Rth 
Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 4fi9 U.S. 1092 (19R2). In Pen:ons, however, no speech 
was permitted by civilians on the base. This is a marked distinction from Brown. 
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The cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in this area 
have been, almost without exception, closely divided with per-
suasive dissenting opinions.54 The dissenting opinions in 
Brown I and Brown II were also convincing. While the 
majority's interpretation of what constituted a public forum on 
the base during the open house was plausible, the dissent pro-
vided the more compelling analysis of the public forum issue. 
The dissent asserted that a public forum was created on the 
day of the open house because of the various other activities 
that were permitted on the base by the Air Force. 
The dissent agreed with the appellant's arguments. First, 
the objective evidence of what actually happened at the Air 
Force base was sufficient to establish that the activities that 
occurred there on Armed Forces Day made the base a public fo-
rum. Second, the Air Force's restrictions on political and ideo-
logical speech were not viewpoint neutral. Finally, military 
bases should not be accorded special status for purposes of 
analyzing whether or not they are public forums. 55 These ar-
guments are discussed below. 
A. The Objective Evidence Shows That a Public Forum Was 
Created 
Air Force personnel testified that they never intended to 
open up the base to be a designated public forum. This is, how-
ever, what they actually accomplished by allowing civilians to 
express viewpoints on non-military topics. While the majority 
concentrated on the subjective testimonial evidence, the dissent 
focused on the objective circumstantial evidence. 
54. See, e.!f., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 4n U.S. 
788 (1985) (participating in Combined Federal Campaign found to be nonpublic 
forum); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (19R5) (finding military bases as 
generally nonpublic fora); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n 460 
U.S. 37 (19R3) (finding school district's internal mail system a nonpublic forum); 
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 82R (1976) (finding a military base during normal train-
ing hours a nonpublic forum); Adderley v. Florida, 3Rfi U.S. 39 (1966) (finding a 
prison a nonpublic forum). 
55. Brown v. Palmer, 944 F.2d 732, 740-42 (lOth Cir. 1991) (Moore, J., dissent-
ing). 
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The majority argued that '"[t]he government does not cre-
ate a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited dis-
course, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional fo-
rum for public discourse.'"56 Under this analysis, the question 
then becomes, what does the government have to do to "inten-
tionally" open a forum for public discourse? The Brown majori-
ties looked principally at the subjective evidence and did not 
give much import to the objective evidence. The Cornelius case 
does not require, however, that the objective evidence be shunt-
ed off to the side. 57 
Rather than trying to fit the Brown cases into the same 
mold as other military free-speech cases as did the majority, 
the dissent recognized that the facts of the Brown cases were 
different than previously decided cases. Contrary to an Eighth 
Circuit case58 relied upon by the majority, the facts of Brown I 
& II show that the base commander allowed other activities to 
take place on the base in conjunction with the open house. 59 
These activities included: 
1) Air Force recruiting; 
2) discussion of weapons systems by defense contractors; 
3) distribution of circulars advertising two different walk-
ing events; 
4) distribution of brochures from the International Plastic 
Molder's Society; and 
5) distribution of an edition of Space Observer.60 
The first two activities can be realistically expected to take 
place at a military open house. The last three, however, are ac-
tivities that indicated to the district court that the military 
turned the open house into a public forum (even if unwittingly) 
on this occasion.61 In essence, the objective evidence suggests 
56. ld. at 734 (quoting Cornelius, 4n U.S. 788 (1985)). 
57. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at R02. 
fiR. Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. U.S. Air Force, 675 F.2d 1010 (Rth Cir.) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1092 (19R2). 
59. Brown, 944 F.2d at 737. 
60. Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 14:i5, 14:iR-:i9 (10th Cir. 1990). 
61. ld. 
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that the base personnel permitted civilians to use the base as 
an open forum to discuss whatever they wanted, regardless of 
whether or not their activity bore any connection either to 
military functions in general or to the mission of the base. 62 
Objectively, the activities permitted by the military at the 
open house demonstrate that the military intended to create 
either a designated or public forum. But, the military opened 
up the forum only to those whose message was not anti-mili-
tary or anti-war. The military invited the public (who pays 
their salaries, through taxes) to come participate in the open 
house, but not to protest against the military in any way. 
If the purpose of the open house is to allow taxpayers to 
see where their substantial "contributions" go, it doesn't appear 
too grievous to allow those same taxpayers the opportunity to 
demonstrate peaceably against particular uses of that money 
once a year at an open house. If the protestors had been ac-
tively passing out brochures at the congressional steps, their 
actions would have been applauded and upheld as the demo-
cratic process at work. But, since they elected to pamphleteer 
on a military base during Armed Forces Day, their actions were 
quashed. 
An impartial look at what actually took place on the base 
during the open house seems to show that the dissenting opin-
ion makes more sense than the majority opinion. According to 
the dissent, the Air Force created a public forum on the day of 
the open house by permitting some in attendance to exercise 
their right to speak on subjects of their choosing while denying 
that same right to the appellants. If the military did not want 
to create a public forum, it should not have allowed private 
62. !d. at 14:38. The base chaplain's participation in various events during the 
open house raises other First Amendment concerns. However, because the chaplain 
is part of the military, his involvement, alone, did not necessarily turn the base 
into a public forum. 
Some of the activities that the chaplain participated in include the following: 
he invited people to the hase chapel to attend a luncheon and a religious ceremo-
ny, he distributed a Catholic book and newspaper extolling the Catholic faith and 
he passed out copies of the Good News Testament Bible with the inscription "Pre-
sented by the Air Force." !d. at 1489. 
Surely, however, opening up the Air Force base to the distribution of literature 
of one religion to the exclusion of other religions raises constitutional questions. It 
would have been interesting to know whether the military would have let other 
religious persuasions on base to proselyte during the open house. With some cre-
ativity the appellants could have argued that their message of pacifism was a reli-
gious view and that this view was shut out by the government's sponsoring of the 
Catholic chaplain. But the protestors made no such arguments. 
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citizens to enter the base and speak out on a variety of topics 
unrelated to the military. 
In his dissent, Justice Moore made a very important 
point-a point crucial to the military. He stressed that his 
opinion did not "imperil the future of military open houses. 
While the majority expresses this concern, it can be easily 
avoided if, in the future, the command ... will refuse to permit 
any form of private speech at its open houses."63 The dissent 
does not, therefore, advocate a ban on military open houses. It 
does, however, ask that the activities that take place at those 
open houses be closely monitored. 
It was of paramount importance to the military that the 
forum be labeled as nonpublic because nonpublic fora carry 
with them no fundamental right to free speech and, therefore, 
avoid strict scrutiny review.64 If, however, the base were a 
public or designated forum on the day of the open house, as the 
dissent claims, the military would have to regulate speech in a 
viewpoint-neutral manner.65 Under public and designated fo-
rum analysis, the military cannot bar the appellants' speech 
simply because they disagree with its content.66 This is what 
the Brown court appears to have authorized. 
B. The Restrictions on the Political and Ideological Speech 
Were Not Viewpoint-Neutral 
1. Granting a forum for some citizens while denying the same 
for the protestors constitutes viewpoint discrimination 
The dissent does not believe that a designated or limited 
public forum can ever be created when certain subjects (such as 
religion, commercial enterprises and nature walks) can be dis-
cussed while other subjects (such as anti-war messages) can-
not.67 The dissent asserts that regulating speech in this man-
ner is simply restricting speech based on its content; it is not 
63. Brown, 944 F.2d at 743 (Moore, J, dissenting). 
64. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
65. Brown, 915 F.2d at 1444. 
66. See supra notes 8-11, 1/i-20 and accompanying text. 
67. See Brown, 91/i F.2d at 1446 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
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viewpoint-neutral regulation of speech. As Judge Moore ex-
pressed in his dissent: 
In this instance, the base was not only opened to the 
public, but it was also open to diverse members of the public 
who were permitted to advertise and present essentially pri-
vate materials of their own interest to the public. The only 
difference between what those civilians did and what the 
[appellants] did was the political content of the [appellants'] 
leaflets.cH 
The dissent argues that once a forum has been opened, 
that forum should be available to all. 69 The crucial issue for 
the dissent, therefore, is whether other leaflets were allowed to 
be circulated by civilians at the open house while the 
appellants' leaflets were barred. 
The dissent contends that the government cannot create a 
designated or limited public forum to regulate viewpoint-based 
speech. Justice Moore explains why: 
When ... the military grants some private individuals the 
right to address the visiting public on issues having nothing 
to do with the military objective of the open house, the mili-
tary has created a public forum. Having done so, the military 
cannot then exclude others from the exercise of their rights to 
free speech just because the military does not agree with the 
political content of their message. 
In this context, it makes no difference to me that the 
military did not intend to open the base to political speech. 
Those in charge unwittingly surrendered their right to regu-
late the conduct of the [appellants] simply by granting other 
civilians the right to speak on subjects of their own choosing 
during the course of an otherwise military event. Having done 
so, the First Amendment does not permit the base command-
er to exclude others who wish to exercise the same right.70 
The dissent asserts that the majority's analysis, which 
argues that opening a base to some topics of speech and ac-
tivities does not mean that it must be opened to all speech and 
6R. !d. 
69. "Once private discourse is encouraged or allowed in a governmental facility, 
that locus has become a forum for the free exchange of all ideas" Brown, 944 F.2d 
at 740 (Moore, J, dissenting) (emphasis added). 
70. Brown, 9lfi F.2d at 1447 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
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activities, is backwards.71 For the dissent, the "proper method 
of analysis is to first determine the type of forum provided by 
the Air Force and then decide whether that forum will permit 
censorship of speech."72 According to this logic, the protestors 
should have been allowed to pass out their literature. 
The dissent's argument, that the government should not 
have the power to create a designated public forum, is valid if 
the key concern is safeguard First Amendment rights. It would 
be a dangerous thing to give the government the power to de-
cide which citizens can speak on its property and which citi-
zens cannot. Perhaps the courts should look closer at this area 
of First Amendment jurisprudence to see if the designated 
public forum is really necessary. 
2. The military also sends out political and ideological 
messages 
Anti-war activists attending the military open house were 
not alone in exercising their freedom of speech. The military 
and the defense contractors were also expressing their political 
and ideological views supporting the military by advocating 
military preparedness and their willingness to go to war. 73 
The military, therefore, conveyed its own ideological messages, 
but denied the protestors' anti-war message. 
Of course, anti-war protestors do not, and should not, have 
unlimited access to military bases so they can protest military 
activities. But when an open forum is created by the military 
as in Brown, these taxpaying citizens should have a right to 
demonstrate peacefully against a strong military. 
The Brown majority maintains that banning the 
appellants' speech is content-neutral because no political 
speech is ever allowed on the base. It is unrealistic, however, to 
think that military and defense contractors do not espouse a 
political view favoring a strong, well-prepared, and well-funded 
military. It is true that the military, itself, makes a political 
statements from which its members cannot divorce themselves. 
71. !d. at 740. 
72. !d. 
73. It is true that the military did not engage in, and has not historically en-
gaged in, the political and ideological issues of when and where to wage war. 
Brown, 9lfi F.2d at l444-4fi, n. 9. Although the military did not hand out pam-
phlets, like the protestors did, they still conveyed an ideological message concern-
ing the role of a strong military in U.S. foreign policy. 
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This is precisely the reason, that the Brown majority should 
have been suspicious of the military's motives in banning the 
appellants' speech. 
This does not mean, however, that protestors should al-
ways be allowed on base. This is an unrealistic policy that the 
dissent and the protestors do not advocate. Rather, their argu-
ment asks only for equal time at the open houses when private 
citizens are allowed to speak out on subjects of their choice. 
Anytime the government is involved in regulating speech, 
great care should be taken to assure that all sides are allowed 
to express their viewpoints, even (and perhaps, especially) 
when they oppose the government or its operations. Refusal by 
the military and the Tenth Circuit to allow the protestors to 
pass out circulars seems to be nothing more than content-based 
regulation of speech. 
The government is, of course, not required to create a des-
ignated public forum such as the open house on Armed Forces 
Day. Upon doing so, however, they should not be able to ban an 
entire type of communication without meeting a strict scrutiny 
analysis by the courts. As Justice Brennan, who dissented in 
United States v. Kokinda74 (the most recent Supreme Court 
public forum case) succinctly stated, ''When government seeks 
to prohibit categorically an entire class of expression, it bears, 
at the very least, a heavy burden of justification."75 
3. Banning the protestors skews the public debate and 
suggests an improper governmental motive 
In addition to the question of whether the military base 
was a public forum on the day of the open house, there are two 
other questions in analyzing whether banning the anti-war 
circulars was really content-based instead of viewpoint-neutral. 
First, does the regulation banning the appellant's circulars 
skew or distort the public debate? Second, do the circumstances 
surrounding the banning the appellants from the base suggest 
an improper governmental motive or justification? 
Whenever the government restricts speech, it is important 
to ask whether that restriction distorts public dialogue by shut-
ting out minority voice or viewpoint. In Brown, this appears to 
be the case because some citizens were allowed to express 
74. 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (citation omitted). 
7fi. !d. at 76fi (Brennan. J., dissenting). 
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themselves freely at the open house, while others were denied 
this right. 76 The actions of all the civilians on the base were 
the same; only the message differed. The government should 
not have the power to exclude one side of a debate merely be-
cause they disagree with it. 
The facts of the case also suggest a possible improper gov-
ernmental motive. The viewpoint expressed by one group was 
shut out because its anti-war message was antagonistic to the 
military's basic mission. Clearly, the protestors were denied a 
forum based exclusively on the content of their message. Un-
doubtedly, the military would have had no argument with the 
protestors if their message was a political or ideological one 
that expressed the importance of a strong, ready-to-wage-war 
military. The free exchange of ideas, vital to the preservation of 
our democratic form of government, was stifled by the Brown 
majority. 
The content-based speech restriction that the court of ap-
peals upheld should be carefully scrutinized. If the government 
has the power to squelch political speech that it deems offen-
sive, perhaps First Amendment jurisprudence is not protecting 
all the First Amendment rights that it should. 
C. Military Bases Should Not Be Accorded Special Status For 
Purposes of Public Forum Analysis 
The public forum issue can be interpreted differently, de-
pending on the importance given to the fact that other civilians 
advertised various endeavors at the open house. The majority 
and dissenting opinions confirm this conclusion. Perhaps public 
forum analysis is not the deciding factor of this case. Maybe 
the whole public forum analysis is essentially a pretext for a 
debate, by the Brown majority and dissent, over the appropri-
ate level of judicial deference to the military in free speech 
cases. 
Essentially, the majority argues that the military should 
be given special status and broad leeway when a court address-
es issues like the public forum issue in Brown. 77 The dissent 
asserts the opposite position. 78 It appears that the public fo-
rum doctrine is being manipulated by each side in an effort to 
76. Brown, 944 F.2d at 740. 
77. Brown, 91fi F.2d at 1440-4:{. 
78. !d. at 1446-47. 
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lend credibility to their arguments. 
Additionally, both sides have distorted the facts and cir-
cumstances. If the doctrine cannot be manipulated far enough 
to support their view, each side disregards the doctrine as 
irrelevant, or ignores slightly different factual circumstances of 
similar cases. The dissent, for example, unable to refute the 
fact that the designated or limited forum has become recog-
nized as a legitimate forum in First Amendment jurisprudence, 
simply stated that no such thing exists and considered the 
doctrine irrelevant. 79 The majority failed to recognize the fact 
that none of the other public forum cases it relied on dealt with 
outside civilians who actively participated in the open house on 
Armed Forces Day as the Brown case did.80 
Both the majority and the dissent in Brown become hope-
lessly lost in the rhetoric of public forum analysis. While ex-
pounding at great length on the public forum issue, both sides 
appear to be unaware that the real issue is how much license 
should be given to the military to decide for itself what First 
Amendment protections should be granted to citizens attending 
the open house. 
The majority opinion affords the military too much leeway 
in regulating First Amendment issues. Indeed, the only re-
quirements the Brown court required of the military were that 
the regulations be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.81 The 
majority held that the facts in Brown satisfied these require-
ments.82 
The underlying assumptions of the Brown judges spring 
forth not only from their views on the appropriate level of judi-
cial deference granted to the military, but also from their views 
on the role and importance of the First Amendment right of 
free speech.s3 The Brown majority takes the position that tra-
ditional fora, such as streets and parks, are sufficient outlets 
for public expression. They conclude, therefore, that the govern-
ment has expansive discretion to decide what kind of speech to 
allow on nontraditional fora, such as military open houses. The 
Brown majority requires only that the military act in a content-
79. Brown, 944 F.2d at 740. 
HO. SPP id. at n9. 
Hl. Brown, 9l.S F.2d at 1444-4fi (Moore, J. dissenting). 
H2. !d. at l44fi. 
83. Their opinions, however, are necessarily based on the required doctrinal 
tests. !d. at 1446-4 7. 
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neutral manner by banning all political speech and that they 
submit a plausible basis for the regulation.M The military eas-
ily passes this rational-basis test. 
The Brown dissent's basic assumptions about First Amend-
ment speech seem more protective of free speech than the 
majority's. The dissent seems to have a strong presumption 
against governmental attempts to regulate speech. The dissent 
seems more suspicious of extensive government power over 
First Amendment speech. The dissent also recognizes that such 
power can be a dangerous thing and should be cautiously 
checked. While it admits that the government needs some pow-
er to curtail speech, it seems to place a heavy burden on the 
government to prove why speech should be restricted. For the 
dissent, the speech should have been allowed in this case be-
cause not only was other unrelated speech permitted, but the 
government could not point to any harm that could have result-
ed from the appellants' speech.85 
1. Goldman and the reflexive deferral philosophy towards the 
military 
Most prior free speech cases favored the military.86 Courts 
consistently used whatever rationale necessary to defer to the 
choices made by the military on its bases.87 While it is true 
that certain groups, such as the military, need broad discretion-
ary powers in order to carry out their assigned functions, an 
automatic deferral that gives the military almost unfettered 
judgment in such an important area as free speech seems ques-
tionable. 
Courts have likely accommodated the military's internal 
decisionmaking because this is necessary, in part, to the 
military's function and esprit de corps. Perhaps the courts have 
been too deferential at times.88 Goldman v. Weinberger89 is 
H4. Id. at 1440. To its credit, the majority would not allow the military to have 
pro-war speeches and demonstrations while denying the opposite to take place. ld. 
The majority feels, however, that since a political discussion was not instigated by 
the military, nothing on that topic can be brought up by the public. ld. The dis-
sent, in contrast, claims that once the government opens up a forum for discussion, 
any topic should be addressable or the restrictions on First Amendment speech are 
impermissible. I d. at 144 7. 
Hfi. Brown, 944 F.2d at 741 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
H6. Brown, 9lfi F.2d at 1441. 
H7. See infra note H9. 
HH. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 47fi U.S. 503 (19H6); see also Note, Allowin{! 
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an example of the courts' hands-off approach toward military 
decisionmaking. In Goldman, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
a free exercise of religion challenge to an Air Force regulation 
prohibiting the wearing of headgear while indoors as applied to 
an orthodox Jewish officer who was disciplined for wearing a 
yarmulke. The Court saw the military as a kind of governmen-
tal unit to which extreme deference should be given, regardless 
of what constitutional right was at stake. 90 
While it seems like a small thing for the government to 
allow Goldman to practice his religion and wear the yarmulke, 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, repeatedly empha-
sized that the military should have complete freedom in its 
judgments.91 In fact, in Goldman, the Court never reached the 
merits of whether the yarmulke was within military regula-
tions.9<: The Court summarily rejected Goldman's argument 
that the Air Force had failed to prove that an exception for the 
wearing of unobtrusive religious clothing would threaten disci-
pline.93 Justice Rhenquist tersely declared that the decision 
was completely up to the appropriate military officials and that 
they were "under no constitutional mandate to abandon their 
considered professional judgment."94 
Justice O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion, contended that 
there was allowance in the military code itself for the wearing 
Free Rr>ipn in thP Military E::;tabli::;hment: Ha::; the Court Allowed Too Much Defer-
ence Where Constitutional Riphts are at Stake?-U.S. v. Stanley, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HIIM. RTs. 27H (1990). In United States v. Stanley, 4H3 U.S. 669 (19H7), a Master 
Sergeant, in the course of Army experimentation, was asked to drink a clear liquid 
which appeared to be a glass of water. In fact, the liquid contained the drug LSD. 
In a fi-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the constitution provided him 
with no remedy because his injuries were inflicted in the performance of his duties 
in the nation's armed forces. Stanley, although a tort claim, is an example of the 
unreasonable deference that the courts sometimes give the military when funda-
mental constitutional rights are at stake. 
H9. Goldman v. Weinberger, 47fi U.S. fiO:-l (19H6). 
90. !d. at fi10. 
91. !d. at fi09-10. 
92. 10 U.S.C. § 774 (19H6) provides a potential exception to military regula-
tions. As amended by Public Law 100-1RO, it reads: 
[A] member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel 
while wearing the uniform of the member's armed forces [unless] 
the wearing of the item would interfere with the performance of the 
member's military duties [or] the item of apparel is not neat and conser-
vative. 
9::!. (;oldman, 4 7fi U.S. at fi09. 
94. !d. at fi09. 
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of unobtrusive religious garments.95 Perhaps, under the regu-
lations, wearing the yarmulke might have been allowed. But 
because the Supreme Court automatically deferred to the mil-
itary, Mr. Goldman's case was never reached on the merits. 
Other religious items have fared better than Goldman's 
yarmulke. For example, the military permits religious jewelry 
and clothing to be worn by Protestants, Catholics and Mor-
mons. One can only speculate at how much turmoil would be 
stirred up if the military banned some of these other types of 
religious items. But just how far the courts will go in deferring 
to the military in the area of religion remains to be seen. 
The dissent in Goldman argued that, at least as a mini-
mum, if the military burdens the free exercise of religion of its 
members in the name of necessity, it should proffer some credi-
ble explanation.96 The Goldman majority, however, neither 
required such an explanation, nor a compelling state interest 
for the regulation.87 
2. Brown and reflexive deferral towards the military 
This same kind of mechanical deferral granted to the mili-
tary by the Goldman Court was also accorded to the military 
by the Brown court. This accommodation philosophy, taken by 
the courts towards the military in First Amendment areas, is 
unsettling. While Goldman dealt with the free exercise of reli-
gion, Brown dealt with another First Amendment area, free 
speech. Brown followed the Goldman approach by allowing the 
military almost unquestioned freedom to regulate the exercise 
of liberties that lie at the base of our Constitution and political 
heritage. Brown completely sidestepped the issue of making the 
military accountable for its regulations that curb some free 
speech while allowing other free speech to take place. 
It is clear that the military must be accorded the right to 
be reasonably free to train and command discipline over its 
members. Although some (like the peace activists in Brown) 
may disagree, the military needs some elbow room to carry out 
its unique charge of protecting our country. If courts, unfamil-
iar with the military, are constantly looking over the shoulders 
9fi. !d. at fi:H (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
96. !d. 
97. !d. at fi09-10. 
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of military personnel, the ability of the military to function 
efficiently may be hindered. 
However, in Brown, the crux of the issue is not a military 
matter, it is a matter of protecting the First Amendment's right 
of free speech. Unless the government can show that it has a 
compelling interest in curbing the speech because of some im-
minent harm, the speech should have been allowed.98 In 
Brown, neither the military nor the majority proffered any 
evidence that there was some imminent harm from the protes-
tors or even that military discipline or esprit de corps were 
threatened. 
According to the base Chief of Staff, the purpose of the 
open house was to "'provide the vital link of public awareness 
that is so important to the federal military forces in a democra-
cy; ... to ensure that the public is well-informed concerning 
the military forces their tax dollars help to support."'99 If this 
is true, perhaps those same taxpayers should have a forum to 
voice their opposition to how the military uses their tax dol-
lars. 
While it is undeniable that certain governmental organiza-
tions, such as the military, need some autonomy to effectively 
carry out their missions, the courts should take a closer look at 
these organizations to see if broad discretion is really necessary 
in all cases. This is especially true for areas that have histori-
cally received great protection in this country, such as the free-
dom of political and ideological speech. 
3. Scrutiny of political and ideological speech prohibition on 
military bases should be increased 
Accommodating the military to such an extraordinary de-
gree is both unnecessary and unhealthy to First Amendment 
concerns. Cases such as Goldman and Brown should be exam-
ined closely because they involve important constitutional 
rights. The merits of adopting an automatic deferral policy 
should be weighed very carefully. The scrutiny of speech prohi-
bition on military bases should be increased. For example, in 
Brown, the Tenth Circuit should have asked whether or not 
9/l. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 4fi 
(19H3). 
99. Brown, 91fi F.2d l43fi, 1446 (lOth Cir. 1991) (quoting Brown v. Palmer, 6H9 
F. Supp. l04fi, 104H (D. Colo. 19HH)). 
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restricting the protestors' speech was really necessary, given 
the other speech that was permitted on the base. 
Political and ideological speech has always been of utmost 
importance in our republican democracy. 100 Without political 
and ideological speech available, the government could become 
more important than the citizens that created it. Instead of 
open communication about government workings and policies, 
the citizens would become subject to an all-powerful govern-
ment that could not be openly criticized. Without such free 
speech, the government would become unresponsive to its citi-
zens and take on a life all its own, acting on its own volition 
and contrary to popular wilL 
V. CONCLUSION 
In considering whether a public forum was created on the 
day of the open house, the objective evidence of what actually 
took place on the base should have been relied on more heavily 
by the Brown majority. By denying the protestors their free-
speech rights, based solely on the content of their leaflets, the 
Brown court erred. Although military bases carry on a unique 
function, they should not be given carte-blanche authority to 
decide free speech issues. If courts continue to automatically 
defer to the military's judgment anytime a First Amendment 
issue arises, perhaps we will see an eroding away of our First 
Amendment rights. 
David M. Jones 
100. Political speech, until Brown, was always held as more important than com-
mercial speech. For example, in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 
(19Rl), the city of San Diego enacted an ordinance prohibiting virtually all outdoor 
advertising display signs. Although the Supreme Court upheld the ordinance for all 
commercial advertising, it invalidated the ordinance as it applied to noncommercial 
advertising. The noncommercial speech (political and ideological) was viewed by 
both the majority and the dissenting opinions as more valuable than the commer-
cial speech, and therefore, entitled to greater protection. ld. at filfi. 
But the Brown court seems to hold the reverse. In Brown, commercial speech 
is given preference over noncommercial speech by the majority; the commercial 
speech of the plastic unions is given greater protection than the protestors' political 
speech. This seems to turn traditional First Amendment jurisprudence on its head. 
Political speech, traditionally viewed with greater scrutiny than commercial speech, 
is now relegated by the Brown majority to a lesser degree of protection. 
